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  • Botha v Coopers & Lybrand (514/00) [2002] ZASCA 47 (21 May 2002)
    aan klein sake ondernemings gespesialiseer het Daarna het Havenga dan ook voortgegaan om die appellant se besigheid te ondersoek en om hom van advies te bedien So het hy byvoorbeeld aan die hand gedoen dat die appellant hom slegs op die bou van leun en sleepwaens toe lê en die ander vertakkings van sy besigheid laat vaar wat die appellant toe gedoen het Voorts het Havenga die appellant geadviseer oor die opknapping van sy boekhoustelsel en het hy ook die appellant se destydse boekhoudster opgelei om die verbeterde stelsel te implementeer As gevolg hiervan was die appellant in staat om finansiële inligting aangaande sy besigheid te bekom en om behoorlike bestuursbesluite op grond daarvan te neem 11 Toe Havenga tydens hulle aanvanklike onderhandelinge uitvind dat die appellant in die vervaardigingsbedryf betrokke was het hy dit teenoor die appellant genoem dat hy in die respondent se Bloemfontein kantoor die spesialis op die gebied van DSR voordele was en dat die appellant se besigheid moontlik vir hierdie voordele kon kwalifiseer Daarop het die appellant aan Havenga opdrag gegee om op die saak in te gaan Uiteindelik het hy in die lig van Havenga se positiewe advies ook aan hom opdrag gegee om n aansoek vir hierdie voordele aan die Desentralisasieraad te rig welke aansoek suksesvol was Die gebeure na 1982 12 Na 1982 het die respondent jaarliks die appellant se finansiële state opgestel en sy inkomstebelastingopgawes voltooi In 1988 het die appellant vir mnr Jaco Scholtz as rekenmeester van sy besigheid aangestel Scholtz het n B Com graad gehad en hoewel hy nooit as geoktrooieerde rekenmeester gekwalifiseer het nie het hy ook sy leerlingskap daarvoor voltooi Na Scholtz se aanstelling het hy die appellant se finansiële jaarstate in konsepvorm opgestel waarna die respondent dit slegs gefinaliseer het 13 Volgens die appellant se getuienis het hy en Havenga jaarliks net voordat die finansiële jaarstate gefinaliseer is n gesprek rondom die state gevoer Tydens hierdie gesprekke is daar dan gekyk na die besigheid se finansieringsbehoeftes na die wins en verlies situasie die kontantvloei situasie sowel as na sekere bedryfsaspekte 14 Benewens hierdie funksies wat die respondent elke jaar herhaal het het die appellant ook van tyd tot tyd aan die respondent opdrag gegee om hom oor meer spesifieke aangeleenthede te adviseer So byvoorbeeld het die appellant eers met Havenga oorleg gepleeg voordat hy vir Scholtz aangestel het en toe hy oorweeg het om n besigheid aan die Rand te koop het hy die respondent versoek om eers n lewensvatbaarheidsstudie aangaande hierdie besigheid vir hom te doen 15 Ondertussen het die appellant se besigheid steeds groter geword In 1986 het hy die huurperseel vanwaar hy die besigheid bedryf het verlaat en n groter perseel wat hy aangekoop het betrek Oor hierdie transaksie het hy nie vir Havenga geraadpleeg nie Net die volgende jaar het die appellant egter n nog groter perseel vir sy besigheid aangekoop wat meer as dubbel soveel as sy vorige perseel gekos het By hierdie geleentheid het hy wel Havenga se hulp ingeroep Blykens die appellant se getuienis was die rede vir sy se oorlegpleging met Havenga by hierdie geleentheid egter nie soseer om advies of gemoedsrus oor sy voorgenome aankoop te verkry nie Die appellant het naamlik verduidelik dat hy probleme ondervind het om finansiering vir die aankoopprys van hierdie nuwe eiendom te bekom Sy bank by wie hy vir sodanige finansiering aangeklop het het verlang dat hy onder meer kontantvloeistate en n bewys van die lewensvatbaarheid van die beoogde uitbereiding voorlê Hiervoor het die appellant Havenga se hulp ingeroep In die loop van Havenga se ondersoek ter uitvoering van sy opdrag het dit blykbaar by hom opgekom dat die uitbreiding wat vir die nuwe eiendom beplan is moontlik as n verdere ontwikkeling in die konteks van DSR voordele kon kwalifiseer en hy het dit so aan die appellant oorgedra Hierop het die appellant aan Havenga opdrag gegee om n aansoek vir die verkryging van hierdie voordele aan die Desentralisasieraad te rig welke aansoek in Januarie 1988 geloods is Ook hierdie aansoek was suksesvol 16 Die beplande uitbreiding waarop die suksesvolle aansoek gebaseer was het toe inderdaad in 1988 en tot in Februarie 1989 plaasgevind Daarna het die appellant se besigheid steeds uitgebrei Ondanks hierdie verdere uitbreidings is daar eers weer in Maart 1995 namens die appellant vir DSR voordele aansoek gedoen Hierdie aansoek waarby ek aanstons weer sal terugkom het betrekking gehad op uitbreidings wat plaasgevind het vanaf Maart 1995 Vir uitbreidings wat plaasgevind het in die tydperk tussen Maart 1989 en Februarie 1995 was daar dus geen aansoek vir DSR voordele nie Hierdie leemte is dan die rede vir die appellant se eis in hierdie saak 17 Ek keer terug na die kronologiese verloop van gebeure In Junie 1993 het Havenga die respondent verlaat om op sy eie te gaan praktiseer en het n ander vennoot in die respondent mnr DA Forster die verantwoordlikheid vir die appellant as kliënt oorgeneem In sy getuienis het Forster homself beskryf as n geoktrooieerde rekenmeester in algemene praktyk wat in teenstelling met Havenga geen kennis van DSR voordele gedra het nie 18 Op 30 September 1994 het die appellant se rekenmeester Scholtz sonder om vir Forster of enige van sy vennote te raadpleeg n poging aangewend om namens die appellant vir DSR voordele aansoek te doen Hierdie poging was onsuksesvol omdat Scholtz die verkeerde aansoekvorm gebruik het Aangesien Scholtz nie as getuie geroep is nie is dit nie duidelik wat hom daartoe beweeg het om hierdie aansoek op sy eie houtjie te bring nie Wat wel duidelik is is dat as gevolg van Scholtz se mislukte poging die betrokke amptenaar van die Desentralisasieraad die appellant na Bronkhorst verwys het wat indertyd as konsultant op die gebied van DSR voordele gepraktiseer het Bronkhorst het toe namens die appellant die aansoek vir DSR voordele voorberei wat gebring is in Maart 1995 waarna ek reeds sydelings verwys het Hierdie aansoek wat soos ek aangedui het betrekking gehad het op uitbreidings wat vanaf Maart 1995 plaasgevind het was uiteindelik ook suksesvol 19 In sy voorbereiding van die 1995 aansoek het Bronkhorst agtergekom dat daar gedurende die tydperk vanaf Maart 1989 tot in Februarie 1995 uitbreidings was wat na sy mening vir DSR voordele gekwalifiseer het maar waarvoor daar nooit aansoek gedoen is nie Op daardie stadium was dit uiteraard te laat vir so n aansoek Hy het by Scholtz navraag gedoen oor hoekom daar nie gedurende genoemde tydperk aansoek gedoen is nie Toe die appellant van hierdie navraag te hore kom het hy vir Forster en Havenga afsonderlik gekonfronteer met die beskuldiging van pligsversuim deurdat hulle hom nie geadviseer het om vir hierdie voordele waarvoor hy gekwalifiseer het aansoek te doen nie Forster se antwoord was dat die appellant hom nooit vir sodanige advies gevra het nie Daarteenoor was Havenga se reaksie dat die uitbreidings van die appellant se besigheid wat plaasgevind het vanaf 1989 tot 1993 toe Havenga by die respondent weg is nie vir DSR voordele gekwalifiseer het nie Was deurlopende advies oor DSR voordele n term van die kontrak 20 Dit bring my dan terug by die vraag of die appellant die kontraksterm waarop sy hele saak rus naamlik dat die respondent hom gedurende die bestaan van hulle kontraktuele verbintenis voortdurend of deurlopend oor die moontlike verkryging van DSR voordele moes adviseer bewys het Volgens die appellant se besonderhede van vordering was hierdie term n uitdruklike alternatiewelik stilswyende alternatiewelik regtens inbegrepe term van die mondelinge ooreenkoms wat hy in 1982 met Havenga as verteenwoordiger van die respondent aangegaan het Uit sommige gedeeltes van die appellant se getuienis wil dit voorkom asof hy inderdaad op n uitdruklike term tot dien effekte steun By nadere ontleding van sy getuienis as geheel blyk dit egter tog nie sy saak te wees nie Die appellant moes naamlik toegee dat Havenga se toekomstige verpligtinge aangaande DSR voordele nooit gedurende die indertydse gesprekke tussen hom en Havenga ter sprake gekom het nie Die hoogwatermerk van die appellant se weergawe hieromtrent blyk te wees dat Havenga in 1982 teenoor hom te kenne gegee het dat hy Havenga weens sy besondere kundigheid oor DSR voordele in staat sou wees om nie alleen as die appellant se rekenmeester nie maar ook as sy adviseur oor die verkryging van DSR voordele op te tree Havenga het egter nooit uitdruklik gesê dat hy sodanige advies sonder enige verdere opdrag of versoek deur die appellant sou verskaf nie Hieruit volg dat in soverre die appellant hom in sy besonderhede van vordering op n uitdruklike term beroep het hierdie beroep nie deur sy eie getuienis ondersteun is nie 21 n Alternatiewe bewering waarop die appellant blykens sy besonderhede van vordering gesteun het was dat die betrokke kontraksterm n regtens geïmpliseerde term van die mondelinge ooreenkoms tussen hom en Havenga namens die respondent was Daar is egter nie namens die appellant na enige regsbeginsel verwys wat hierdie alternatiewe bewering ondersteun nie en ek weet ook nie van so n regsbeginsel nie Hierdie moontlikheid kan dus buite rekening gelaat word n Verdere moontlikheid wat deur die Hof a quo geopper en ondersoek is is dat die term waarop die appellant steun by wyse van n handelsgebruik deel van die ooreenkoms tussen die partye geword het Aan die hand van hierdie ondersoek was die Hof a quo se bevinding egter dat die appellant nie aan die streng vereistes vir die bewys van n term geïmpliseer deur handelsgebruik voldoen het nie Ek stem met hierdie bevinding saam Sien byvoorbeeld Golden Cape Fruits Pty Ltd v Fotoplate Pty Ltd 1973 2 SA 642 C Aangesien die appellant se advokaat dit in hierdie Hof onomwonde gestel het dat die appellant hom nie op n term geïmpliseer deur handelsgebruik beroep nie vind ek dit onnodig om hierdie bevinding nader toe te lig n Stilswyende Term 22 By wyse van eliminasie kon die kontraktuele beding waarop die appellant steun dus slegs by wyse van n stilswyende term deel van die mondelinge ooreenkoms tussen die partye geword het Deur erkening te verleen aan n stilswyende term word aan die onuitgesproke bedoeling van die partye dieselfde gesag as aan hulle uitgesproke bedoelings verleen Aangesien dit by n stilswyende term per definisie gaan om n bedoeling wat nooit in woorde uitgedruk is nie is die bepaling daarvan afhanklik van n afleiding Juis omdat aan hierdie term wat op n afleiding gebaseer is dieselfde gewig gegee word as aan dit wat die partye uitdruklik ooreengekom het is die afleiding van n stilswyende term slegs geregverdig as dit met n groot mate van sekerheid gemaak kan word Daarom sê Rumpff HR in South African Mutual Society v Cape Town Chamber of Commerce 1962 1 SA 598 A 606 B dat n stilswyende bepaling alleen dan in n kontrak ingelees sal kan word wanneer die Hof oortuig is dat daar inderdaad n bedoeling was dat die betrokke bepaling in die kontrak opgesluit lê en dat al die partye tot die kontrak sodanige bedoeling gehad het 23 Die vermaarde toets vir die vastelling of die afleiding van die beweerde stilswyende term wel geregverdig is is die sogenaamde nie amptelike buitestaander officious bystander oftewel die buitestaander toets wat reeds dikwels in die verlede deur hierdie Hof toegepas is Sien byvoorbeeld Alfred McAlpine Son Pty Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 A 533 A B en Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 ZASCA 53 1994 3 SA 130 A 137 A D Hierdie toets het sy oorsprong in die volgende dictum van Scrutton LJ in Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co Ramsbottom and Another 1918 1 KB 592 CA 605 A term can only be implied if it is such a term that it can confidently be said that if at the time the contract was being negotiated some one had said to the parties What will happen in such a case they would both have replied Of course so and so will happen we did not trouble to say that it is too clear Unless the Court comes to some such conclusion as that it ought not to imply a term which the parties have not expressed 24 Oor die jare is die buitestaander toets in beslissings van ons howe verfyn en sy praktiese bruikbaarheid daardeur verhoog So het Colman R byvoorbeeld in Techni Pak Sales Pty Ltd v Hall 1968 3 SA 231 W 236H 237A beslis dat die afleiding van n stilswyende term slegs geregverdig is indien die buitestaander se vraag a prompt and unanimous assertion of the term by beide partye tot die ooreenkoms sou ontlok het As een van die partye byvoorbeeld sou aandui dat hy eers die saak verder wil oorweeg of dat hy eers sekere onduidelikhede wil opklaar voordat hy sy antwoord gee slaag die beweerde stilswyende term nie die toets nie n Verdere vereiste wat ook al gestel is is dat n stilswyende term slegs afgelei kan word as dit vir duidelike formulering vatbaar is Of soos Trollip AR dit stel in Desai Another v Greyridge Invetsments Pty Ltd 1974 1 SA 509 A 522H 523A I do not think that it is either clear or obvious which of those forms of the term should prevail and hence that none can be implied The reason is that the implication of a term depends upon the inferred or imputed intention of the parties to the contract and once there is diffficulty and doubt as to what the term should be or how far it should be taken it is obviously difficult to say that the parties clearly intended anything at all to be implied 25 By beantwoording van die vraag wat waarskynlik die partye se antwoord op die buitestaander se tersaaklike vraag sou wees laat die hof hom hoofsaaklik lei deur die uitdruklike terme van die ooreenkoms en die omringende omstandighede ten tyde van kontraksluiting sien byvoorbeeld South African Mutual Aid Society supra 606C en Alfred McAlpine Son Pty Ltd supra 531 in fine Dit is egter ook toelaatbaar om te kyk na die optrede van die partye na die sluiting van die ooreenkoms Hierdie ondersoek is gerig op die vraag of die latere optrede van die partye versoenbaar is met die bewering dat die stilswyende term deel gevorm het van hulle kontrak Sien byvoorbeeld Wilkens NO v Voges supra 143C D en Christie op cit 196 26 Die volgende stap is dan om hierdie regsbeginsels op die onderhawige feite toe te pas Met verwysing na die omringende omstandighede tydens kontraksluiting het die appellant vier gronde van ondersteuning gevind vir sy beroep op n stilswyende term waarvolgens die respondent hom deurlopend oor die moontlikheid van DSR voordele moes adviseer Eerstens dat Havenga hom voorgehou het as n deskundige op die gebied van DSR voordele wat indien die appellant vir die respondent as sy rekenmeester sou aanstel in staat sou wees om die appellant ook van advies aangaande die verkryging DSR voordele te voorsien Tweedens dat die beskikbaarheid van hierdie bykomdende dienste juis een van die appellant se beweegredes was om die respondent as sy rekenmeester aan te stel Derdens dat daar minstens n verstandhouding tussen die appellant en Havenga was dat die kontraktuele verhouding tussen die partye nie na n enkele transaksie tot n einde sou kom nie maar vir n onbepaalde tyd sou voortduur en van n deurlopende aard sou wees Vierdens dat Havenga daar en dan uit eie beweging die appellant geadviseer het oor die moonlikheid dat hy vir DSR voordele mag kwalifiseer Die afleiding wat volgens die appellant deur hierdie oorwegings geregverdig word is saamgevat in die volgende gedeelte van die betoogshoofde wat namens hom geliasseer is Uit hoofde van die voormelde het die respondent soos verteenwoordig deur Havenga n aanbod aan die appellant gemaak dat ingeval van aanstelling deur die appellant van die respondent as rekenmeesters van die besigheid die respondent voortaan gedurende die bestaan van die kontraktuele verbintenis wat voortspruit uit die aanstelling vir die appellant as deskundige op die gebied sal adviseer met betrekking tot DSR voordele Hierdie aanbod is deur die appellant aanvaar en gevolglik het daar dienooreenkomstig n ooreenkoms tot stand gekom 27 Die verdere betoog namens die appellant was dat ook die optrede van die partye na die sluiting van die mondelinge ooreenkoms daarop dui dat die stilswyende term waarop hy hom beroep deel van hulle ooreenkoms was Ter ondersteuning van hierdie betoog is daarop gewys dat Havenga in 1982 en toe weer in 1988 sonder dat hy pertinent daarvoor gevra is die moontlikheid van die verkryging van DSR voordele teenoor die appellant geopper het en daarna ook die aansoek om sodanige voordele namens die appellant hanteer en tot n suksesvolle uiteinde gevoer het Daarbenewens is ook ondersteuning gevind in Havenga se reaksie toe hy in 1995 daarmee gekonfonteer is dat hy versuim het om in die tydperk tussen 1989 en 1995 die appellant oor die moontlike beskikbaarheid van DSR voordele te adviseer Volgens die appellant se getuienis was Havenga se reaksie op daardie stadium nie dat hy geen verpliging gehad het om sodanige advies te gee nie maar dat die appellant gedurende die betrokke tydperk nie vir DSR voordele gekwalifiseer het nie Die waarskynlikhede is so is namens die appellant aan die hand gedoen dat indien Havenga geglo het dat hy nie kontraktueel verplig was om die appellant oor DSR voordele te adviseer nie hy dit onmiddellik sou gesê het 28 Laastens is namens die appellant aangevoer dat sy saak ondersteun word deur die feit dat Havenga nie deur die respondent as getuie geroep is nie 29 Geriefshalwe handel ek eers met die appellant se beroep of die partye se optrede na kontraksluiting In hierdie verband bied die feit dat Havenga in 1982 die moontlikheid van DSR voordele geïdentifiseer het en toe namens die appellant vir daardie voordele aansoek gedoen het myns insiens nie steun vir die appellant se beroep op n stilswyende term nie Uit die appellant se getuienis is dit immers duidelik dat Havenga gereageer het eerstens op n spesifieke opdrag om die appellant se besigheid te ondersoek en hom van finansiële advies te
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2002/47.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v Fick en 'n Ander (713/92) [1994] ZASCA 184; 1995 (2) SA 750 (AD); [1995] 2 All SA 78 (A) (30 November 1994)
    in n maatskappy Die aandelesertifikaat is wel prima facie bewys dat die geregistreerde aandeelhouer wie se naam daarop verskyn die 20 reghebbende is maar hy mag in werklikheid nie die sogenaamde beneficial owner wees nie maar slegs laasgenoemde se genomineerde Standard Bank v Ocean Commodities supra te 289A C Of hy mag soos Botha beweer Fick gedoen het sy regte al vervreem en oorgedra het en nie eers n genomineerde wees nie Anders as in die geval van grond kan daar dus ondanks die inskrywing in die register ondersoek word wie die werklike reghebbende is Randfontein Estates supra te 982 Derdens is hierdie nie n geval waar een of ander stap ter voltooiing van die sessie deur n wet kyk byvoorbeeld Rabinowitz and Another v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 1958 3 SA 619 A te 636E F deur ondergeskikte wetgewing kyk byvoorbeeld Guman se saak supra ter aangehaalde plaatse of deur ooreenkoms vereis word nie Die vraag is net of afgesien van daardie gevalle n sedent regtens verplig word om nadat die oordragsooreenkoms klaar gesluit is iets verder te doen om die sessie geldig te maak Gestel as n saak van beginsel is die onderhawige vraag 21 dus die volgende is dit sonder meer n geldigheidsvereiste van die sessie van n vorderingsreg die bestaan waarvan uit n dokument blyk óf dat lewering van die geskrif aan die sessionaris geskied 6f dat die sedent all effort in bovermelde sin moet uitoefen Daar is geen gemeenregtelike gesag vir die standpunt dat lewering van die betrokke dokument nodig is vir die geldigheid van n sessie van die soort vorderingsreg waarmee ons hier te doen het nie Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of gouth Africa Ltd 1968 3 SA 166 A te 172E H Scott op cit 40 Prof A N Oelofse 1990 43 THRHR 62 3 Die vroegste melding van lewering as n vereiste in die onderhawige verband kom voor in Smuts v Stack Vendue Master Van Reenen and Karnspeck 1 Menzies 297 wat in 1828 beslis is Die sedent skuldenaar het sy vee op n veiling laat verkoop en die afslaer se vendurol wat op die opbrengs betrekking gehad het aan een van sy skuldeisers gesedeer en gelewer n Ander skuldeiser het later op die opbrengs beslag 22 laat lê en aansoek om oorbetaling aan hom gedoen Sy aansoek het misluk Wat die sessie aspek betref word die hof se uitspraak kort en karig soos volg in die verslag opgesom by the law of this colony the cession of a debt is completed by delivery of the deed constituting it having the cession endorsed thereon without the necessity of any other form or solemnity Daar is gevolglik bevind dat die uitwerking van die sessie was om die sedent se reg op die opbrengs aan die sessionaris oor te dra Wat as die bron van die betrokke law of this colony beskou is word nie gemeld nie Nóg hier nóg in latere sake is na enige statutêre vereiste in hierdie verband verwys En as dit bedoel is as n verwysing na die Romeins Hollandse reg wat wel die reg van die Kolonie was was die stelling klaarblyklik verkeerd beide ten opsigte van lewering en endossement Mens weet ook nie of die vereistes vir n geldige of effektiewe sessie enigsins in geskil of gedebatteer was nie Streng gesproke beteken die woorde the deed constituting the debt die dokument waarin die skuld of vorderingsreg 23 beliggaam word verwysende dus na n vorderingsreg in bovermelde eerste kategorie Dit is egter moeilik om te verstaan waarom die vendurol in Smuts se saak beskou is as n dokument constituting the debt Daar kan derhalwe nie tot die slotsom gekom word nie dat die Hof in daardie saak bedoel het om die leweringsvereiste tot die eerste kategorie van vorderingsreg te beperk In 1846 het Laing v Zastron s Executrix 1 Menzies 229 voor die hof gedien Die sedent was gelyktydig die behoorlik gemagtigde verteenwoordiger van sy vrou en van n ander prinsipaal In n skriftelike sessie het hy n verbandakte ten opsigte waarvan sy vrou die verbandskuldeiser was aan die prinsipaal gesedeer Die sessie en die verbandakte het in die sedent se besit gebly maar is deur hom onder die prinsipaal se dokumente gebêre en nie onder sy eie nie Die prinsipaal het aksie ingestel om lewering van die verbandakte aan hom te verkry Die vrou se verweer was onder andere dat die sessie nie deur lewering voltooi is nie Die hof het bevind dat daar 24 voldoende lewering was om die sessie te voltooi Hierdie bevinding verskyn in n opsomming bestaande uit een kort sin en die hof se redes waarom lewering nodig was is onbekend Daar is egter n verdere rede waarom die saak die onderhawige bespreking nie verder neem nie die vorderingsreg wat daar betrokke was val nie in enigeen van bovermelde kategorieë nie Dit was deur n verband verseker en sessie van die vorderingsreg kon nie sonder oordrag van die verband geskied nie Sien De Wet en Van Wyk op cit 252 voetnoot 4 en vergelyk ook Lief N O v Dettmann 1964 2 SA 252 A te 271D H In Mills and Sons v Trustees of Benjamin Bros 1876 Buchanan 115 het dit gegaan oor die sessie van n wissel Die Hof by monde van De Villiers HR sê te 122 dat waar according to the custom of merchants the cession is incomplete without delivery of the instrument of cession delivery cannot be dispensed with In the case of a bill of exchange the cession of the right to receive the amount from the parties liable is not complete without delivery of the bill itself and as the bill now in question was never delivered to the plaintiffs the right to recover 25 the amount from the Bank was never vested in them Dit dien daarop gelet te word soos Scott op cit 27 voetnote 21 en 22 verduidelik dat deur instrument of cession die Hof klaarblyklik Sande 2 17 misverstaan het en dat wat eintlik gelewer moes word nie n sessie akte was nie maar die stuk waarin die verpligting beliggaam is Dat dit nodig was in Miiis se saak om lewering te vereis is te verstane maar die soort vorderingsreg wat betrokke was val nie binne die kategorie van regte wat tans ter sake is nie Morkel v Holm 2 SC 57 is in 1882 beslis Daar het Morkel n versekeringspolis op sy lewe by wyse van n geregistreerde voorhuwelikse kontrak aan sy vrou gesedeer Ingevolge die sessie het hy die polis geneem en in haar hangkas gebêre Later het hy dit egter aan Holm gesedeer en gelewer Na Morkel insolvent verklaar is het sy vrou terughandiging van die polis geeïs Die Hof het bevind dat aangesien Morkel ooreenkomstig die huweliksvoorwaardekontrak die reg gehad het om sy vrou se eiendom te administreer hy op grond daarvan gemagtig was om 26 lewering van die polis namens haar te aanvaar Fiktiewe lewering het dus aan haar geskied Boonop was daar daadwerklike lewering toe die polis in haar hangkas geplaas is Die sessie in die huweliksvoorwaardekontrak is derhalwe deur lewering voltooi en die eis het geslaag Die Hof het gemeen dat Laing se geval supra analoog was en dat die beslissing in daardie saak deurslaggewend was Na my mening was Laing se saak duidelik onderskeibaar en dus nie gesag vir die slotsom wat in Morkel se saak bereik is nie Die Hof in Morkel het ook geen redes verstrek waarom lewering van die polis noodsaaklik was om sessie regtens doeltreffend te maak nie Dit blyk eenvoudig veronderstel te gewees het dat lewering n vereiste vir voltooiing van die sessie was Op die dag na die beslissing in Morkel is die uitspraak in Fick v Bierman 2 SC 26 deur dieselfde hof gelewer Sessie word beweer maar daar word bevind dat dit nie bewys is nie De Villiers HR merk te 34 in die verbygaan soos volg op 27 The importance of requiring the best evidence of the cession of rights of action becomes manifest when we consider some of the consequences which under the Roman Dutch law attach to the cession of an action In 1891 in Wright Co v The Colonial Covernment 8 SC 260 was die vraag of n sessie van vorderlngsregte voortspruitend uit n konstruksieooreenkoms voltooi was voordat die later insolvente sedent n tweede sessie van dieselfde regte aangegaan het Die kwessie van lewering het nie ter sprake gekom nie maar sekere aspekte van die uitspraak van De Villiers HR is insiggewend Te 269 sê hy The law of this Colony reguires no particular form of words for the purpose of effecting a complete cession of action What it does require is that the intention to effect the cession should be clear and beyond doubt as was decided in Fick v Bierman 2 Juta 26 and that no further act should be necessary to complete the cession as was decided in Mills v Benjamin 6 Buch 115 Daar sal onthou word dat Mills se saak met n wissel te doen gehad het waar lewering vanselfsprekend nodig was om n sessie daar te stel 28 In Wright was dit gemene saak dat die vraag of die eerste sessie voltooi is volgens Engelse equity regsbeginsels beslis moes word Te 269 270 het De Villiers HR opgemerk dat die beginsels van daardie regstelsel wat van toepassing was in Wright nie wesenlik verskil het van die reg wat in die Kolonie gegeld het nie Hy verwys in hierdie verband onder andere na wat hy as n toonaangewende Engelse saak beskou Ryall v Rowles 1 Ves 348 en verduidelik daaromtrent ook te 270 it was held that in order completely to divest a bankrupt of debts owing to him he must have done everything that is equivalent to a delivery of movable goods and one of the judges Sir Thomas Parker said that that which is equivalent to delivery of movables is in the case of a debt an assignment and delivery of the security and notice to the debtor of the assignment Uiteindelik is daar bevind dat die eerste sessie wel deur kennisgewing aan die skuldenaar voltooi is en dat die eerste sessionaris dus reghebbende geword het en in weerwil van die tweede sessie reghebbende gebly het Wat die Engelse reg betref waarna die Hoofregter verwys moet daar gelet word op wat Lord Chief Baron Parker in Ryall 29 se saak presies gesê het Die volledige verwysing is Ryall v Rowles 1 Vesey Senior 348 en is te vinde in English Reports band 27 1074 Daar het n koopman bankrot gespeel nadat hy feitlik al sy eiendom roerend onroerend en onliggaamlik skulde en ander vorderingsregte óf met verskeie verbande en pande beswaar het óf ter sekerheidstelling gesedeer het Hy het egter besit van die roerende goed behou Mededingende aansprake van versekerde skuldeisers of vermeende versekerde skuldeisers en algemene skuldeisers het die vraag laat ontstaan of die insolvent se regte doeltreffend oorgedra is en indien wel tot watter mate Na n verwysing na tersaaklike wetgewing waarvolgens goods and chattels ook choses in action insluit sê Lord Parker te 367 1085 But it is said there can be only an equitable assignment of a chose in action which is true and yet in case of bonds assigned for bills of exchange or promissory notes are assignable at law they must be delivered and such delivery of the bond on notice of assignment will be equivalent to the delivery of the goods and all has not been done to divest the right from the bankrupt and to vest a right in the mortgagee for no notice appears to be given 30 Hieruit blyk dit eerstens dat saaklike sekerheidsregte en regte voortspruitende uit verhandelbare stukke daar op gelyke voet behandel is wat sedeerbaarheid betref Albei soorte regte soos reeds gesê val buite die kategorie waarmee die onderhawige saak te doen het Tweedens is lewering van n dokument gelyk gestel aan lewering van n roerende saak Ongeag of dit gedoen is weens die wetsbepalings wat daar ter sprake was al dan nie is dit n benadering wat aan ons reg vreemd is Selfs in Jeffery v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 waaroor meer hieronder waar te 22 lewering van die dokument as n formaliteitsvereiste beskou is word spesifiek verduidelik dat die rede nie is omdat sodanige lewering gelykstaande is aan lewering van n roerende saak nie Derdens kom dit voor dat n equitable assignment vereis dat wat ons die sedent sou noem alles moet doen om hom van sy regte te ontdoen Laasgenoemde vereiste het klaarblyklik later aanleiding gegee tot die sogenaamde leerstuk van all effort Daar is ook ander opsigte waarin De Villiers HR se 31 stelling dat die Engelse reg van equitable assignments en die gemene reg eners is blykbaar ongegrond was Hulle word deur Scott op cit te 29 en 30 behandel en behoef geen verdere kommentaar vir huidige doeleindes nie Die volgende saak wat aandag verg is McGregor s Trustees v Silberbauer 9 SC 36 wat in 1892 beslis is Kort voor sekwestrasie van sy boedel het McGregor sekere aandele verkoop waarvan hy die geregistreerde houer was Hy is daarvoor betaal en het die aandelesertifikate in blanko geëndosseer en aan die koper gelewer maar hulle het in McGregor se naam geregistreer gebly Die kuratore se aanspraak op die aandele het misluk In die loop van die Hof se uitspraak sê De Villiers HR die volgende te 38 The question in the present case is whether in the case of the sale of shares where the vendor has done everything which lies in his power to give transfer of the shares the purchaser acquires no right as against the trustee of the vendor s insolvent estate I n the case of the cession of a right of action the Court has more than once held that when the cedent the vendor has done everything in his power to effect the cession of his right of action the cession is completed It was only 32 in the recent case of Wright v The Colonial Government that this was fully discussed Die geleerde Hoofregter siteer dan die hierbo aangehaalde passasie uit Wright se saak en gaan voort te 39 A right of action is conveyed as soon as the vendor has done everything in his power to divest himself of his right of action Behalwe Wright se saak is geen gesag aangehaal nie maar die geleerde Hoofregter se toepassing van equity beginsels is hier duidelik te bespeur In Jacobsohn s Trustee v Standard Bank 16 SC 201 1899 het Jacobsohn n familietrust geskep en daarna n lewenspolis aan die trustee skriftelik gesedeer Die sessie is nie op die polis geëndosseer nie en Jacobsohn het die polis behou Mettertyd sedeer hy dit aan iemand anders Daar is beslis dat sonder lewering die eerste sessie nie die uitwerking gehad het om die polis aan die trustee oor te dra nie In die loop van die uitspraak sê De Villiers HR te 203 4 die volgende In the case of a negotiable instrument the Court has held that delivery actual or constructive is essential to 33 transfer the ownership Mills vs Benjamin Buch 1876 p 122 In the subsequent case of Morkel vs Holm 2 Juta 57 it was assumed that delivery was essential for the purpose of a complete cession of a life policy but the Court held that there was sufficient proof of such delivery to the plaintiff Where a right of action exists independently of any written instrument the cession of such right may be effected without corporeal delivery of any document Where however the sole proof of a debt is the instrument which records it the cession of the debt is not complete until the instrument is delivered to the cessionary By the law of some countries notification of the cession to the debtor is required to complete it but by the law of this Colony the cession may be complete without such notification Voet 18 4 15 Now I am not prepared to say that circumstances may not arise under which a cession of action may be completed without delivery of the instrument which constitutes the proof of the debt The document may for instance be lost and in such a case if the cedent has done everything in his power to divest himself of his right of action there is no reason why the cession should not be held to be complete But among the things required under such circumstances to be done by the cedent would certainly be the notification of the cession to the debtor Met die eerste helfte van wat in daardie passasie verskyn kan geen fout gevind word nie Die Hof erken die behoefte aan lewering in die geval van n verhandelbare stuk en som Morkel se saak korrek op deur te sê dat dit beslis was slegs op die veronderstelling dat lewering nodig was in die geval van n 34 lewenspolis Vervolgens word twee stellings gemaak wat ongetwyfeld volkome in ooreenstemming met die gemene reg is naamlik waar die vorderingsreg nie onafhanklik van die betrokke dokument kan bestaan nie word lewering vereis en waar die reg wel onafhanklik van die dokument kan bestaan word dit nie vereis nie Ongelukkig het die Hof egter voortgegaan en lewering vereis in die geval van n lewenspolis wat nie n dokument is wat die verpersoonliking van die versekerde se vorderingsreg is nie Daardie reg bestaan onafhanklik van die polis Gordon Getz The South African Law of Insurance 4e uitgawe te 133 4 Lawsa Band 12 par 64 Boonop word obiter gesê dat indien die tersaaklike dokument verlore is die sedent everything in hiis power to divest himself moet doen as surrogaat vir lewering In Smith v Farrelly s Trustee 1904 TS 949 het Smith en Farrelly gesamentlik vier paghoewes gekoop Die huur vir 99 jaar is nie geregistreer nie Farrelly is as huurder in die skriftelike huurkontrakte aangewys maar die kontrakte self is 35 in Smith se besit gelaat waar hulle voortaan gebly het Met verloop van tyd het Farrelly n bedrag geld aan Smith geskuld Hulle het toe mondeling ooreengekom dat Smith Farrelly se een helfte belang in die huurkontrakte as sekuriteit sou hou Daarna het Farrelly insolvent gesterf Die vraag was of Farrelly sy belang aan Smith geldig verpand het Die Hof Smith R met wie Bristowe en Curlewis RR saamgestem het bevind dat Farrelly se belang vatbaar was vir n geldige pand en dat n mondelinge sessie voldoende was om Farrelly se regte vir panddoeleindes aan Smith oor te dra Te 956 word gesê Where as in the present case the evidence of the right is contained in the written instrument which records it then the right cannot be completely ceded unless the instrument is delivered to the cessionary Jacobsohn s Trustee v Standard Bank 9 CTR 188 Daar word voorts bevind dat die partye se mondelinge ooreenkoms lewering by wyse van constitutum possessorium daargestel het Die bevinding in Smith dat lewering geskied het beteken dat dit onnodig was om te beslis of lewering n vereiste was vir die voltooiing van die sessie Die vraag of lewering n 36 vereiste vir voltooiing was is nie geopper ondersoek of beslis nie Die Hof maak net n stelling in hierdie verband Daar kon eenvoudig veronderstel gewees het dat lewering noodsaaklik was Bygevolg dra die aangehaalde passasie in Smith myns insiens niks by tot wat in Jacobsohn gesê is nie In 1934 dien Block v Universal Produce Co Pty Ltd 1934 NPD 324 voor die hof Daar sedeer Block sekere vorderingsregte aan sy vrou Etlike maande later op aandrang van Universal Produce word op een van die vorderingsregte beslag gelê Bekragtiging van die beslaglegging word deur Block se vrou bestry maar desondanks deur n landdros toegestaan Block appelleer na die Natalse Provinsiale Afdeling Met verwysing na al die bovermelde gewysdes van Mills tot Smith se sake supra word namens Universal Produce pertinent betoog dat die sessie ongeldig was aangesien nóg die skriftelike sessie nóg die dokument waaruit bewys van die betrokke vorderingsreg bestaan het aan Block se vrou gelewer is In die uitspraak van Lansdown R waarmee Hathorn R saamgestem het verskyn daar 37 te 328 die volgende I am not aware that it is necessary to the validity of a cession that the document creating it and the documentary evidence of the right ceded should pass into the possession of the cessionary rather it seems to me that the importance of the absence of any such procedure lies solely in this that it might support a contention that in truth no cession was ever made Aangesien die hof daarna bevind het dat fiktiewe lewering in elk geval bewys is is die aangehaalde passasie obiter dictum Dit dien egter daarop gelet te word dat hierdie die eerste tersaaklike gewysde is aangaande n vorderingsreg in die onderhawige kategorie waar lewering gesien is nie as n element of vereiste van sessie nie maar slegs as bewys daarvan Soos ek later sal aantoon word daardie beskouing ondersteun deur die gevolgtrekking wat te make is uit De villiers HR se opmerkings waarna daar hierbo verwys is In 1937 kom die saak van Jeffery v Pollak and Freemantle supra voor hierdie hof Die feite van daardie saak wat tans ter sprake is was die volgende In Oktober 1933 word ene Hunt n aandelemakelaar in Kaapstad opdrag gegee om 65 38 aandele in The Sub Nigel Limited maatskappy namens Jeffery te koop en hulle in Jeffery se naam te laat registreer Deur Pollak en Freemantle aandelemakelaars van Johannesburg die respondente koop Hunt onder andere 65 Sub Nigel aandele maar ondanks betaling deur Jeffery en ondanks latere ondertekening deur Jeffery van n oordragsvorm as oordragnemer versuim Hunt om registrasie te verkry Intussen word daardie aandele tesame met ander Sub Nigel aandele deur die respondente namens Hunt verkoop In Januarie 1934 koop die respondente 100 Sub Nigel aandele in opdrag van Hunt Vroeg in Februarie verkry Hunt registrasie van 65 van daardie aandele in Jeffery se naam In die oordragsdokumentasie word Jeffery se naam as oordragnemer deur Hunt vervals Mettertyd ontvang Hunt die aandelesertifikate van die Sub Nigel maatskappy Hy hou hulle in sy besit as Jeffery se verteenwoordiger In September 1935 gee Hunt opdrag aan die respondente om Jeffery se 65 aandele te verkoop Op die oordragsvorm word Jeffery se naam weer eens deur Hunt vervals hierdie keer as oordraggewer Handelende 39 op hierdie oordragsvorm verkry die respondente registrasie van die aandele in die naam van ene Freemantle n lid van hul firma wat die aandele te goeder trou ontvang en daarvoor betaal Ondanks die respondente se opposisie verkry Jeffery n bevel van die Witwatersrandse Plaaslike Afdeling vir rektifikasie van Sub Nigel se lederegister waarvolgens sy naam as geregistreerde houer van die betrokke 65 aandele weer op die register aangebring is Die respondente se appèl na die Transvaalse Volbank slaag maar die bevel van die hof van eerste instansie word daarna deur hierdie hof herstel Drie uitsprake is in hierdie hof gelewer maar die uitslag was eenparig Op die feite was twee sessies van Jeffery se aandele ter sprake Ten opsigte van die eerste deur Hunt aan Jeffery word bevind dat laasgenoemde daardeur reghebbende geword het en dat Hunt daarna geen regte met betrekking tot die aandele kon gehad het nie Bygevolg word bevind dat dit regtens onmoontlik was om enige regte aan Freemantle by wyse van die tweede sessie oor te dra 40 Curlewis HR vestig die aandag daarop dat hy n lid van die hof in Smith se saak was en verwys op bladsy 14 van die Jeffery saak na die stelling in Smith dat lewering nodig is om sessie te voltooi waar n vorderingsreg evidenced by a document was Hy sê dat hy niks het om by te voeg nie en bevind op die getuienis dat Hunt die nodige gedoen het die vervalsing van Jeffery se naam qua oordragnemer ten spyt om Jeffery in staat te stel om geregistreerde eienaar van die aandele te word Daarna het Hunt die aandelesertifikate vir en namens Jeffery ontvang en het hy hulle in daardie hoedanigheid met Jeffery se toestemming gehou In hierdie omstandighede word bevind dat daar geen rede was om die sertifikate aan Jeffery self te lewer nie Stratford AR onderneem n volledige bespreking van die betoog namens die respondente dat Jeffery nooit animus acquirendi en Hunt nooit animus transferendi gehad het nie Hy wys daarop dat daardie betoog onvoldoende rekening hou met die regsposisie waarvolgens lewering van n vorderingsreg glad 41 nie soos lewering van n roerende saak benader kan word nie Te 22 sê hy In general all that is necessary to transfer a right of action is a contract of cession I have said in general because in some cases cession of a right against another cannot be effected without the obligator s consent or only by the observance of certain formalities Also if there is a document which evidences the title to the right it must be delivered to the cessionary Smith v Farrelly s Trustee 1904 TS 949 but not because this is the equivalent to delivery of possession of a chattel but because the delivery of the document is a requisite formality of cession in such cases There can be no delivery of a jus in personam Such a right passes on cession effected with such formalities as the case may reguire A share is a jus in personam the ownership of which passes by cession in due form per Innes CJ in Liquidators Union Share Agency v Hatton 1927 AD at p 251 En te 23 bevind die geleerde Appèlregter dat aan die leweringsvereiste wat in Smith se saak vermeld word voldoen is In die uitspraak van Beyers AR waarmee Watermeyer WnAR saamgestem het word lewering behandel slegs in die samehang van die betoog namens die respondente dat lewering van die aandelesertifikaat aan Jeffery n vereiste was vir die sessie 42 aan hom Sonder verwysing na enige gesag word te 28 bevind dat lewering van die sertifikaat op appellant se naam aan Hunt was n lewering aan appellant en bewvs van die sessie My kursivering Wat die tweede sessie aanbetref is die betoog namens die respondente geopper dat die aandele nooit aan Jeffery oorgedra is nie en dat Hunt deurentyd reghebbende ten opsigte van die aandele tot September 1935 gebly het Derhalwe aldus die betoog toe Hunt die aandelesertifikaat aan Freemantle gelewer het het laasgenoemde op grond van die beginsel neergelê in McGregor s Trustees v Silberbauer supra eienaar geword Slegs Stratford AR het kommentaar op Silberbauer se saak gelewer In die ander uitsprake word bevind dat die tweede sessie regtens ondoeltreffend was om die eenvoudige rede dat Freemantle nie daardeur in n beter posisie as Hunt geplaas kon word nie sien 10 14 en 29 In verband met McGregor s Trustees v Silberbauer sê Stratford AR te 24 The principle enunciated in Silberbauer s case and I 43 think generally accepted as good law is that a cession of shares is complete as between the parties when the cedent has done all in his power to divest himself of his right of action and to put the transferee in a position to demand recognition by the obligor Assuming that Hunt was the real owner of these shares as counsel contends and that he bona fide wished to transfer them to respondent his proper and only legitimate course was to call upon appellant to sign a transfer form in favour of respondent and if appellant failed to comply to apply to Court to have the latter s name removed from the register and his own substituted This was the only legal course Instead he forged appellant s name He cannot therefore be said to have done everything in his power to effect the cession within the meaning of the rule in Silberbauer s case Die tersaaklike dicta in Jeffery kan derhalwe soos volg opgesom word Die stelling in Smith dat lewering noodsaaklik is vir die voltooiing van die sessie van n vorderingsreg evidenced by a document is nooit in Jeffery in twyfel getrek of eers gedebatteer nie Curlewis HR en Stratford AR het die saak benader op die aanvaarding dat daardie stelling juis was Hulle bevinding dat lewering in elk geval plaasgevind het het dit onnodig gemaak om die korrektheid van die stelling te toets Hulle het dit dan ook nie beslis nie En Beyers AR het 44 na die lewering aan Hunt verwys nie as voltooiing van die eerste sessie nie maar slegs as bewys daarvan Wat die ontluikende all effort leerstuk betref wat in Silberbauer se saak te bespeur is was Stratford AR se kommentaar natuurlik obiter Sodra die belese appèlregter die slotsom bereik het dat Hunt by wyse van die eerste sessie hom van alle regte met betrekking tot die aandele ontdoen het was dit klaarblyklik onnodig om die Silberbauer beginsel te bespreek of enige mening omtrent die korrektheid daarvan uit te spreek Trouens SilJberbauer is net toegepas op die veronderstelling in die respondente se guns dat Hunt ten tye van die tweede sessie nog die reghebbende was en daar was klaar bevind dat hy dit nie was nie Gevolglik is Jeffery se saak na my mening nie werklik gesag vir enige van die volgende stellings nie naamlik dat lewering van die betrokke dokument n requisite formality by sessie is dat lewering nodig is in die sin van n substantiewe vereiste om n sessie van die onderhawige soort 45 vorderingsreg te voltooi en dat n sedent alles in sy vermoe moet doen om hom van sy vorderingsreg te ontdoen en om die sessionaris in staat te stel om recognition by the obligor te eis Hierdie gevolgtrekking word versterk deur n passasie in Rabinowitz v De Beers Consolidated Mines supra waar Schreiner AR nadat hy na Jeffery se saak verwys het die volgende te 636F G gesê het T he common law position is that rights are transferred by cession with the apparently established rider that when the right is represented by a document this must generally be delivered to the transferee My kursivering Daar het dit gegaan oor mededingende aansprake op sekere regte ingevolge sertifikate uitgereik kragtens Wet 44 van 1927 Die respondente het hulle aanspraak op die betrokke regte gebaseer op n reeks sessies met gepaardgaande lewering van die sertifikate Die appellante het hulle aanspraak gegrond op die skepping van n duplikaat sertifikaat en die registrasie daarvan in die kantoor van die mynkommissaris Daar word 46 bevind dat die betrokke Wet geen voorsiening vir laasgenoemde prosedure maak nie en dat dit die respondente is wat reghebbendes geword het Aangesien lewering van die sertifikate wel geskied het was dit weer eens onnodig vir hierdie hof om n oorwoë mening uit te spreek aangaande die leweringsaspek Wat egter belangrik is is dat die hof in Rabinowitz klaarblyklik nie Jeffery se saak beskou het as gesag daarvoor dat lewering van die betrokke dokument wel n vereiste vir die geldigheid van n sessie is nie Die onderhawige vraag het weer in hierdie hof ter sprake gekom in labuschagne v Denny 1963 3 SA 538 A waar die eiser se regte en verpligtinge ingevolge n huurkoopkontrak by wyse van n geskrewe akte van oordrag aan die verweerder oorgedra is Nóg die akte nóg die kontrak is aan die verweerder gelewer Daar is namens die eiser betoog dat om hierdie rede geen regte aan die verweerder oorgedra is nie Botha AR het die uitspraak van die Hof gegee en te 543 in fine tot 544B sê hy die volgende 47 vir hierdie bewering is gesteun op die reël dat waar die bewys van n vorderingsreg in n geskrif vervat is lewering van die geskrif aan die sessionaris noodsaaklik is nie vir die geldigheid daarvan nie maar vir die voltooiing van n sessie van daardie vorderingsreg aan hom Jeffery v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 op bl 14 en 22 Morkel v Holm 2 SC 57 Jacobsohn s Trustee v Standard Bank 16 SC 201 Smith v Farrelly s Trustee 1904 TS 949 Dit is egter duidelik dat die reël wat in bedoelde gewysdes aanvaar is nie betrekking het op die geldigheld van die oordrag van n vorderingsreg nie maar slegs op die bewvs van die behoorlike voltooiing van so n oordrag sien Block v Universal Produce Co Pty Ltd 1934 NPD 324 op bl 328 en dat die reel slegs geld in die geval van mededingende aanspraakmakers op oordrag van dieselfde vorderingsreg Dit kan dus nie geld tussen sedent en sessionaris nie Daar sou trouens geen rede wees waarom tussen sedent en sessionaris n oordrag verydel sou kon word bloot omdat die geskrif waarin die bewys van daardie vorderingsreg vervat is nie deur die sedent aan die sessionaris oorhandig was nie My kursivering Onmiddellik na hierdie passassie egter word beklemtoon dat die eis nie met sessie nie maar met delegasie te doen het Die Hof verduidelik dat anders as by sessie waar die vorderingsreg wat oorgedra word bly voortbestaan die betrokke vorderingsreg by delegasie uitgewis word en dat daar bygevolg geen rede bestaan waarom lewering vir die voltooiing van n 48 delegasie noodsaaklik is nie Die dictum so pas aangehaal was soos tereg namens Fick betoog is derhalwe ohiter Die vraag bly staan of die mening uitgespreek in Z abuscAagne aangaande die reel ten opsigte van lewering waarna ek gerieflikheidshalwe as die leweringsreël sal verwys nietemin korrek is Na daardie vraag keer ek aanstons terug Labuschagne se saak is in Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1968 3 SA 166 A aangehaal In laasgenoemde geval het die appellant depositobewyse aan n kliënt uitgereik ten opsigte van beleggings wat sy by appellant gemaak het Dit was n voorwaarde van die bewyse dat hulle nog oordraagbaar nóg verhandelbaar was Toe die kliënt mettertyd voorskotte van appellant ontvang sedeer sy aan appellant in securitatem debiti die vorderingsregte wat sy ingevolge die bewyse verkry het Gepaardgaande daarmee oorhandig sy die bewyse aan appellant Later kry sy die bewyse van appellant terug maar 49 sonder om haar skuld te delg Sy sedeer toe dieselfde vorderingsregte aan respondent as sekerheidstelling vir n bedrag wat sy aan laasgenoemde verskuldig was en met die oog daarop lewer sy die bewyse Albei instellings maak toe aanspraak op die gesedeerde regte Die vraag of lewering van die bewyse vir sessie noodsaaklik was is nie deur die meerderheid van die Hof behandel nie Botha AR met wie Steyn HR en Potgieter AR saamgestem het kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die betrokke vorderingsregte onderhewig was aan n pactum de non cedendo en dus nie vir sessie vatbaar was nie Van Blerk AR meen egter dat die eerste sessie doeltreffend was dat appellant daardeur reghebbende geword het en in navolging van Morkel se saak en Wright se saak supra dat ondanks verlies van besit van die bewyse appellant reghebbende gebly het Wat die hierbo aangehaalde obiter dictum in Labuschagne betref wys Van Blerk AR daarop dat dit gevolg het onmiddellik na verwysing na onder andere Morkel se saak 50 supra en dat die beslissing in Morkel nie in Labuschagne gekritiseer is nie Daar sal onthou word dat die tweede sessionaris in Morkel lewering verkry het maar dat die Hof bevind het dat die eerste sessionaris desondanks reghebbende gebly het Aangesien die leweringsreël in Morkel toegepas is moet daar aldus Van Blerk AR aanvaar word dat die Hof in Labuschagne beskou het dat in Morkel die reël korrek toegepas was Dit volg bevind hy dat die dictum in Labuschagne nie teen die appellant is nie en dat laasgenoemde ondanks die tweede sessie reghebbende met betrekking tot die bewyse gebly het Ogilvie Thompson AR aan die ander kant meen dat die reël heeltemal korrek in Labuschagne gestel is en herbevestig moet word dat dit slegs toepassing vind waar daar mededingende sessionarisse is en nie tussen sedent en sessionaris nie en dat indien die reël korrek toegepas word wat na sy
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/1994/184.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v Giyose t/a Paragon Fisheries (447/06) [2007] ZASCA 73; [2007] SCA 73 (RSA) (31 May 2007)
    s case the fact that respondent brought the action on behalf of an undisclosed principal was an afterthought hence the argument was only raised at appeal stage According to the summons as well as evidence led in the court a quo plaintiff did not consider himself as an agent of an undisclosed principal The conclusion must inevitably be that the respondent failed to prove that he had the necessary locus standi at the time when he initiated the action against the appellant Therefore the court a quo erred in this regard The appeal was therefore allowed and the order in the magistrates court set aside and an order of absolution from the instance substituted 8 It would appear that the doctrine of the undisclosed principal was not fully understood The rights of the agent as against the third party are succinctly summarised by Joubert LAWSA 2ed paras 228 and 231 as follows Par 228 In a standard situation of representation the representative acquires no rights and incurs no liabilities from the contract concluded by him or her on behalf of his or her principal The rights and obligations come into being between the principal and the third person In an undisclosed principal situation the intermediary and the third person create vincula iuris between themselves by the contract concluded in their own names but also so it is said alternative vincula iuris between the undisclosed principal and the third person Par 231 The contract is concluded between the third person and the intermediary acting in his or her own name The third person is in terms of the contract liable to the intermediary He or she cannot avoid liability to the intermediary on the ground that he or she is liable to the undisclosed principal unless and until the undisclosed principal elects to hold him or her liable The reliance on Gravett NO v Van der Merwe supra was misplaced What Booysen J meant in the passage quoted is better stated in Sentrakoop Handelaars Bpk v Lourens 1991 3 SA 540 W a case relied upon by Booysen J as authority for his proposition where Marais J said the following at 545D I am therefore of the view that both on principle and on the authorities it is not proper for an agent to sue as representing his principal by suing in his own that is the agent s own name where the claim being enforced is that of the principal and the principal is the true plaintiff This does not of course apply where the agent has the right to sue in his own name as is the case where he has contracted on behalf of an undisclosed principal and sues on the relevant contract The appellant throughout the negotiations and conclusion of the agreement acted in his personal capacity No mention was made of the close corporation It seems clear that what happened as so often does with lay persons is that the appellant did not see the close
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2007/73.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v Iveco South Africa (Pty) Ltd (430/2011) [2012] ZASCA 78 (28 May 2012)
    directed that the appellant s special plea be heard and decided separately from and before the other issues and that those issues be stayed in the meantime After hearing evidence the court dismissed the special plea with costs but subsequently granted the appellant leave to appeal to this court 4 The high court s reasoning was that prescription began to run in January 2004 when the respondent acquired knowledge of the breach of the warranty but that it was interrupted on 8 September 2005 when the respondent gave the appellant an opportunity to resolve the dispute with the municipality In coming to this conclusion the high court relied on the breach of the warranty clause but failed to take into account the fact that the respondent had in its pleadings invoked the indemnity clause for the relief sought In that regard it misconstrued the true cause of action by the respondent 5 The crux of the claim by the respondent is simply that whilst it is so that the breach of the warranty came to its attention by January 2004 the debt at that stage had not become due and payable It contends that it was only on 17 July 2007 the date on which it discharged the outstanding liability in terms of the indemnity clause that it became entitled to recover the amount it paid from the appellant In a nutshell the respondent contends that although its claim was dependent on the breach of the warranty its consequent relief was not based on the breach itself but on the indemnity clause which it could invoke only after it had paid the municipality This in my view is correct for the reasons that follow 6 The claim by the municipality which the respondent paid is what is envisaged in clause 9 1 2 quoted above That and the other indemnities given in clause 9 were expressly stated to be without prejudice to the warranties in the Agreement or of the rights and legal remedies available to the Purchaser Thus whatever rights the respondent had for breach of a warranty it had a separate specific remedy for an indemnity in terms of clause 9 inter alia if a warranty was breached 7 Clause 9 2 requires the respondent to advise the appellant timeously of a claim or obligation covered by clause 9 1 2 In terms of clause 9 2 1 the appellant could require the respondent to oppose the claim in which event he would be obliged to provide the respondent with security to cover the full claim together with attorney and own client costs which the respondent might incur or which might be ordered against the respondent as a result of such opposition In terms of clause 9 2 2 should the appellant not require the respondent to oppose the claim timeously the respondent would be entitled to pay such claim and recover the full amount thereof together with all costs incurred on a scale as between attorney and
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2012/78.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (446/2007) [2008] ZASCA 106; 2009 (1) SA 227 (SCA) ; [2009] 1 All SA 312 (SCA) (23 September 2008)
    his trust account or was reflected in his books of account 11 The investigation by Mr van Rooyen led him to the conclusion that the appellant had contravened the following provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder s 78 1 of the Act in that not all monies received by the appellant were deposited into his trust account ss 78 4 and 6 of the Act read with rules 68 1 and 68 2 in that the appellant s accounting records did not reflect all transactions of the practice rule 68 5 in that the accounting records were not up to date rule 68 7 in that the appellant did not account to Mr Biyela within a reasonable time rule 68 8 in that amounts were not paid over to clients within a reasonable time rule 68 9 in that payment to other practitioners was not made within a reasonable time rule 69 1 in that trust money was not promptly deposited rule 89 5 in that there was a failure to reflect all financial transactions in the books of account of the practice and rule 89 7 in that the payment of trust money to clients after due demand was delayed without lawful excuse 12 In his answering affidavit the appellant pointed to the predicament in which he had found himself after the R40 000 had gone missing He said that with the exception of the payments in respect of the Biyela Mangwane transaction all amounts paid to him in trust had been deposited into his trust account although he explained that with a few exceptions he conducted a criminal practice at the magistrates courts and received no money in trust for his services He further explained that he was without exception paid at the conclusion of each criminal trial in many cases from the repayment of bail money and usually deposited those payments directly into his business account The appellant also admitted that he had not timeously submitted audit reports required by Rule 70 for two years 2003 and 2004 although he pointed out that unqualified certificates had subsequently been issued to him for those years and for 2005 13 The remaining two complaints received by the respondent from Mrs van Wyk and attorneys De Abreu Cohen Inc can be dealt with more briefly Mrs van Wyk complained that the respondent had not given proper attention to her instructions to appeal against the refusal of the South African Police Services to grant her a firearm licence The appellant s explanation was that he was waiting for the record which he had requested from the South African Police Services and the delay was due to their failure to provide it Mrs van Wyk s attitude was that he had not acted sufficiently pro actively She terminated his instructions He did not give her a receipt for her payment of R1 000 He refunded this amount to her together with a further amount of R1 500 in respect of her travelling costs The complaint of attorney Cohen of the firm De Abreu Cohen Inc was that the appellant did not reply to their letters of 24 April 28 May and 1 June 2004 proposing a settlement between their respective clients who were engaged in civil litigation The appellant admitted that he had not done so but pointed out that the matter had subsequently been settled and that the complaint against him withdrawn The charge that he had failed to attend a disciplinary hearing in respect of the Van Wyk and De Abreu Cohen complaints when summoned by the respondent was conclusively refuted in his answering affidavit he did attend but the hearing did not proceed 14 In the course of its judgment the court a quo said In Respondent se hele relaas en verontskuldigende bewerings is daar nie een enkele woord van verskoning nie Hy maak n gebrek om trustgelde in te betaal op n trustrekening of dadelik uit te betaal soos die laaste twee paaiement in die Biyela aangeleentheid af as n nietigheid Sy houding is dat omdat niemand sogenaamd skade gely het nie die siviele litigasie wel geskik is en De Klerk wel betaal is en Van Wyk se fooie terugbetaal is het hy nie onprofessioneel ensovoorts opgetree nie Die groot probleem myns insiens in Respondent se hele antwoord en verweer is dat hy hoegenaamd geen insig toon in dit waaroor dit hier gaan nie 15 The court a quo materially misdirected itself on the facts The appellant did not deny that he had been guilty of any unprofessional conduct His attitude was Alhoewel ek wel nie aan alle bepalings van toepassing op my praktyk en werksaamhede as prokureur van hierdie Agbare Hof voldoen het nie ontken ek dat ek sodanig onprofessioneel oneerbaar of onbetaamlik opgetree het wat hierdie Agbare Hof sou noop om my van die rol van prokureurs te skrap Of course he put facts before the court which placed the offences which he had committed in a less serious light There is nothing wrong with that But he did not attempt to exculpate himself as the court a quo found Indeed he remarked with justification that when questioned by Van Rooyen E k geen doekies omgedraai het nie en het met die hele sak patats vorendag gekom en onmiddellik toe ten spyte van my eie nadeel en verleentheid aan Van Rooyen die volle ware verhaal vertel en ek het nooit enigsins gepoog om n verskoning te gebruik of om nie die volle verhaal hoe inkriminerend ook al teenoor myself te openbaar nie Nor did he dismiss as insignificant his failure to pay trust monies into his trust account or make payments out of it as the court a quo said This finding was without factual foundation It is true that the appellant did not apologise but that in my view is all together too tenuous a basis for finding that he has no insight into the potential prejudice or harm that his conduct may
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2008/106.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (50/08) [2009] ZASCA 13; 2009 (3) SA 329 (SCA) [2009] 3 All SA 295 (SCA) (19 March 2009)
    R2 000 and several smaller amounts with a t or v inscribed next to them It was common cause that these abbreviations referred to a transfer transport or a bond verband to be registered by the appellants On one of these invoices number 44 the amounts for transfers bonds and the R2 000 sponsorship is totalled at R5 834 96 It contains an additional total of R4 500 At the foot of the invoice in manuscript the number 22420 is written Marais suspected this to be the number of one of the firm s cheques He could not find such a cheque but suggested in his report that it was probably given in payment to Stefprop Eiendomme for the registration of property transfers and mortgage bonds referred to the firm 13 The appellants denied Marais inference and tendered the following explanation in a supplementary answering affidavit deposed to by the second appellant on behalf of all of them 51 1 Ek ontken dat die Respondente kickbacks of direkte betalings gemaak het vir die verwysing van opdragte deur Stefprop Eiendomme na die firma 51 2 Soos ek verduidelik het in paragraaf 42 5 van my Beantwoordende Beëdigde Verklaring is n maatskappy met die naam van Red Lager Edms Bpk gestig om agentekommissie op n voorskot basis teen n bepaalde rentekoers aan eiendomsagente uit te betaal My eggenoot asook die Derde Respondent se eggenoot is direkteure van Red Lager Edms Bpk en is ook die enigste aandeelhouers in hierdie maatskappy 51 3 Op hierdie basis het Red Lager die kommissie op verskeie transaksies van Mnr Heinrich Strydom van Stefprop Eiendomme voorgeskiet Sommige van hierdie transaksies het egter platgeval en was Strydom n bedrag van ongeveer R60 000 00 aan Red Lager verskuldig welke bedrag hy nie kon terugbetaal nie Omdat Stefprop Eiendomme en meer spesifiek Strydom op daardie stadium alreeds n geruime tyd oordragte na die firma verwys het en die feit dat Strydom n ongerehabiliteerde insolvent was het die Derde Respondent en ek ons eggenote oortuig om nie teen Strydom stappe te neem nie en het Strydom onderneem om voort te gaan om verder oordragte na die firma te verwys in n poging om ten minste tot n mate te vergoed vir die verlies wat ons eggenote gely het 51 4 Die brief en fakture waarna die Applikant verwys is bloot aan die firma gestuur as n aanduiding van die waarde van werk wat Strydom na die firma verwys het Ek noem ook dat Strydom n motorfiets aan my en die Derde Respondent gegee het om sy verskuldigheid te delg 12 51 5 Ek wens ook te verklaar dat Strydom die outeur van hierdie fakture was en dat hierdie fakture nooit aan die firma gerig was op my of die Derde Respondent se aandrang nie Ek voer met eerbied aan dat Strydom se keuse van die boekstaaf van die waarde van transaksies wat hy verwys het sy metode was 51 6 In die fakture verwys Strydom na borgskappe Op die stadium voordat ons die praktyk van borgskappe gestaak het het ons ook van tyd tot tyd vir Strydom geborg Op sy versoek het hy die waarde van sulke vorige borgskappe ook in ag geneem sonder dat ons dit ooit betaal het 51 7 Ten tye van Marais se ondersoek het ek en Marais saam gepoog om n verband tussen die bedrae en die fooie wat die firma op hierdie transaksies verdien het te vind en was dit vir ons en hom onmoontlik om dit te doen 51 8 Ek verklaar onomwonde dat die firma nooit enige geld aan Strydom oorbetaal het nie Ek kan net noem dat Strydom inderdaad steeds oordragte na die firma verwys My emphasis 14 Aside from the fact that this explanation itself amounts to an admission of touting 13 its significance for the current discussion is that the appellants emphatically denied that they had made any payment on these invoices A challenge addressed to the appellants on the non availability of the cheques that the invoices refer to and therefore the absence of corroboration for their version prompted two cheques to be annexed by them to a further supplementary answering affidavit One is a business cheque number 02242 and one a trust cheque number 36161 Cheque 02242 is made out by the firm in favour of De Jongh Ontwikkeling in the amount of R5 834 96 the same as the first total on invoice 44 Cheque 36161 is made out by the firm in favour of De Jongh Ontwikkeling in the amount of R4 500 the same as the second total on invoice 44 The explanation that accompanies the two cheques is that it serves as proof that value was attached to the work referred by Stefprop Eiendomme to the applicant in settlement of the debt owed to Red Lager and De Jongh Ontwikkeling 15 These cheques undeniably support the inference originally drawn by Marais and belie the appellants explanation that they made no payment on the strength of these invoices Only one conclusion is possible the appellants were telling blatant untruths not only about making payments on these invoices on behalf of Stefprop Eiendomme to its creditor but about never having paid for work referred to them The suggestion in argument that the denial in para 51 8 of the appellants supplementary answering affidavit quoted at the end of para 13 above is factually correct inasmuch as payments were not made to Strydom but to a creditor of his firm Stefprop Eiendomme if accepted compounds the problem as this would constitute a deliberate half truth intended to mislead 16 Further to the complaint of touting the appellants made several payments to estate agents for which they could not provide source documentation to substantiate their denial that it was for work referred to them They never explained the reason for 5 of these payments These unsubstantiated payments to estate agents were posted in the ledger to bad debts drawings and miscellaneous office expenses indicating an intention to
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/13.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v Regional Magistrate Cox N.O. and Another (736/07) [2009] ZASCA 42; [2009] 3 All SA 373 (SCA) (31 March 2009)
    and could not have been away for more than a minute The discussion was about a prosecutor and when she returned she did not get the impression that something else had been discussed in her absence 8 The state called the prosecutor and the investigating officer to testify about the entry in the docket The investigating officer admitted that she told the appellant s attorney that LDS stood for landdros but stated that she used it as an abbreviation for the state the prosecutor or the court She stated that she never spoke to the first respondent and that she had not received an instruction from a magistrate The request that she should personally obtain a statement from Van Rensburg came from the prosecutor The prosecutor testified that she could possibly have given the instruction to the investigating officer It was never suggested to her that she received the instruction from the first respondent 9 The first respondent dismissed the application for his recusal whereupon the appellant applied to the court below for his decision to be reviewed In his founding affidavit the appellant alleged that the admission of Dr Labuscagne s evidence and the entry in the docket indicated unequivocally that the first respondent was biased against him He alleged furthermore that the evidence of Captain Potgieter during the hearing by the first respondent of the recusal application and the discussion between De Kock and the first respondent created the impression that the first respondent was biased against him 10 The first respondent in his answering affidavit denied that he was biased against the appellant In respect of the entry in the docket he referred to the evidence led in respect of the recusal application and stated that the investigating officer never received the instruction from a magistrate In respect of the conversation with De Kock he stated that the conversation was not about the appellant s criminal case and annexed a supporting affidavit by De Kock confirming that that was the case 11 The court below held that it was clear on the evidence that the first respondent had not given an instruction to the investigating officer to consult with Van Rensburg and also that the first respondent had not discussed the appellant s case with De Kock He held that any suspicion of bias on the part of the first respondent was not based on reasonable grounds 12 On appeal before us the appellant applied for leave to introduce new evidence The evidence he wished to introduce was that of his attorney It was to the effect that another attorney Mr Okes informed him off the record during the time that the application for recusal was being heard that the first respondent had told him that he had given the instruction that the investigating officer should personally obtain a statement from a state witness Okes told him that the first respondent sought his advice in this regard Because the appellant s attorney thought that there was sufficient
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/42.html (2013-04-07)

  • Botha v S (425/08) [2009] ZASCA 125; [2010] 2 All SA 116 (SCA) (30 September 2009)
    to persuade a court to re examine the judg ment and the issues raised therein he was prepared to grant the Fund such an oppor tunity inter alia in view of the fact that a large amount of money is involved here 7 He accordingly directed that a special case in the following terms be referred to the court for an opinion in terms of s 20 1 of the Act 1 In the matter of Zysset others v Santam Limited 1996 1 SA 273 C this Honourable Court made the following order at 282D E With regard to the claim of each plaintiff no deduction from the damages as finally determined by this Court is to be made in respect of the amount or any portion thereof which was or is to be received from IV SUVA or Berner and which in terms of the agreement of 7 December 1992 falls to be repaid to IV SUVA or Berner Any portion of the amount received from IV SUVA or Berner in respect of patrimonial loss which in terms of the agreement is not repayable shall be deducted from the damages so determined 2 The issues which arose from the Zysset matter have also arisen in the present arbitration 3 The defendant questions the correctness of the decision in the Zysset matter the claimant contends that it was correctly decided 4 This Honourable Court is accordingly in terms of s 20 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 requested to determine the following issue Whether on the facts stated therein the order in the Zysset matter was correctly made or not If not the court is requested to state what the order should have been The high court 19 The Fund was not satisfied with the arbitrator s formulation of the issue and applied to the high court for an order 1 compelling the arbitrator to state the questions of law in the form as initially formulated on behalf of the Fund 8 alternatively and in any event 2 to determine the issue as formulated by the arbitrator in the special case The claimants opposed the application and sought to persuade the court that it should decline to hear the matter 20 The learned judge like the arbitrator felt obliged inter alia in the light of the test laid down in Halfdan Grieg and in view of the amount involved and the importance of the issue to deal with the question of law stated by the arbitrator Having heard argu ment the high court upheld the Fund s argument that the Zysset case had been wrongly decided The court however did not consider it necessary or appropriate to redraft the order as requested by the arbitrator The correct ness or otherwise of the high court s opinion as such is not in issue before us by reason of s 20 2 of the Act which provides that a n opinion referred to in sub section 1 shall be final and not subject to appeal and shall be binding on the arbitration tribunal and on the parties to the reference 21 The learned judge thereafter dealt with the relief claimed in para 1 and stated as follows at paras 29 31 Counsel were in agreement that it would not be appropriate at this stage either to direct the arbitrator to refer the questions to this court or for me to decide the questions myself The reason is that it will be necessary to establish what the objects of the Belgian scheme are in order to come to a decision as to whether payments received under this scheme are payments which are to be deducted from the amount of damages awarded I accordingly direct that in respect of the questions raised the arbitrator may receive such further evidence as the parties may wish to present concerning the objects of the Belgian scheme and he may then state the questions as points of law together with his findings of fact if he concludes on such further evidence that the objects of the Belgian scheme are materially different from those of the Swiss scheme considered in Zysset The authority to refer the matter back to the arbitrator relates only to the question of benefits already received from the Belgian scheme and not to any future benefits which Dr Thomas may receive 22 The order issued by the registrar pursuant to the judgment did not reflect the directives contained in paras 30 and 31 quoted above and read as follows 1 The court concluded that the decision in Zysset others v Santam Ltd 1996 1 SA 273 C is incorrect and that in that case the amount or any portion thereof which was received by any of the plaintiffs from IV SUVA or Berner should have been deducted from the amount of damages awarded to him or her 2 First and second respondents claimants are to pay the applicant s Fund s costs 23 Both sides were dissatisfied with the judgment as well as the form of the order of the high court and sought leave to appeal and to cross appeal against it In his judgment granting the necessary leave the learned judge clarified the original order by explaining that what he had intended to convey was that in respect of past benefits he neither granted nor refused the application but in respect of future benefits the application was refused In terms of the provisions of uniform rule 42 1 b the original order was accordingly amended by insertion of the following new para 2 and con sequential renumbering of the existing para 2 2 The relief sought in para 1 of the notice of motion is refused insofar as it pertains to benefits to be received receivable by or for the benefit of Dr Thomas Save as aforesaid no order is made on para 1 of the notice of motion On appeal 24 In its appeal to this court the Fund took issue mainly with the rider added in the new para 2 of the order based on the first sentence in para 31 of the judgment quoted above to the effect that future benefits were to be excluded from the scope of any further enquiry before the arbitrator The Fund contended that there was no distinction in principle or in law between past and future benefits and asked that para 2 of the order as amended should be set aside 25 In their cross appeal on the other hand the claimants argued that the high court should have declined to deal with the Zysset question at all and should have dismissed the application The cross appeal is based on two alternative grounds first that the high court had no jurisdiction to furnish its opinion on the question as stated by the arbitrator second that the court erred in exercising its discretion to furnish its opinion In the light of the issues raised I find it convenient to deal with the cross appeal first Jurisdiction 26 Regarding the question of jurisdiction the claimants argued that in terms of s 20 1 of the Act an arbitrator is not entitled mero motu to refer a question of law to a court 9 In this case the question as formulated by the arbitrator was one which neither party had asked him to state A comparison of the questions raised in para 1 of the notice of motion and the question actually stated by the arbitrator reveals that they are materially different questions The questions which the appellant asked to be stated did not in their formulation mention Zysset at all In effect therefore the arbitrator decided mero motu to state the question something which he was not legally em powered to do 27 The claimants submitted further that although Zysset would no doubt have been raised in argument before a court had the arbitrator reserved the questions requested by the Fund it is by no means obvious that the court would have had to determine whether Zysset was right or wrong or that a finding on that question if made would have been decisive of the questions of law which the Fund actually asked the arbitrator to state 28 I doubt whether it would be correct on these facts to hold that the high court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter In my view the argument amounts to no more than this that the high court erroneously exercised the powers it enjoyed in terms of s 20 1 not that it did not have the necessary power at all 10 29 There was also some debate before us as to whether the question stated by the arbitrator meets the jurisdictional threshold of being a question of law In the form that the question has been framed it requires the court to examine the facts in Zysset in order to determine whether or not the court on those facts came to the correct conclusion it does not require examination of the correct ness or otherwise of any underlying legal principle as to which benefits are collateral and which are deductible from the patrimonial damages suffered by a plaintiff In any event with regard to the latter aspect this court has held that questions regarding the deductibility of collateral benefits cannot be answered by reference to a single juridical test instead it is acknowledged that policy considerations of fairness ultimately play a determinative role 11 Moreover p erceptions of fairness may differ from country to country and from time to time the task of Courts is to articulate the contemporary perceptions of fairness in their respective areas of jurisdiction 12 30 More recently this court after quoting the above extract from Dug more s case expressed agreement with the statement that questions regarding collateral benefits are normative in nature they have to be approached and solved in terms of policy principles and equity and that in doing so there should always be a weighing up of the interests of the plaintiff the defendant the source of the benefit as well as the community in establishing how benefits resulting from a damage causing event should be treated 13 31 Although this argument is not without merit I do not find it necessary in the light of my views regarding the alternative argument to come to a final conclusion on this aspect of the case I accordingly turn to consider the question whether the high court erred in the exercise of its discretion in furnishing its opinion Discretion 32 Counsel for the claimants referred to English authority 14 in support of the proposition that the court enjoys a discretion whether or not to deal with the question of law stated by an arbitrator It is correct as pointed out by counsel for the Fund that the cases relied on were decided on the wording of the English Act which is materially different from s 20 of our Act 15 Nonetheless I have no doubt that the position in our law is similar in other words the mere fact that an arbitrator has seen fit to state a question of law for the opinion of the court does not oblige the high court to furnish such opinion If the court should consider for example that on proper analysis the question of law posed is irrelevant to the issues in the arbitration or that the facts recorded in the special case do not enable the law point to be sensibly adjudicated the court would be justified in declining to decide the point This must be so as other wise the courts could theoretically be swamped with irrelevant and unneces sary questions of law arising from arbitrations 33 As for the factors influencing the exercise of an arbitrator s discretion in terms of s 20 1 it has until recently been accepted by our courts that when the three requisites as laid down by Lord Denning in the Halfdan Grieg matter are satisfied an arbitrator should be obliged to state a case 16 In Telcordia 17 how ever this court firmly rejected that approach In a unanimous judgment Harms JA re examined the scope of s 20 of the Act and inter alia said the following The first matter I wish to address is the nature of the arbitrator s discretion Eloff J in Kildrummy sought to curtail the general and unrestricted discretion the section gives to the arbitrator There is no reason having regard to the wording of the section for such an approach Rules circumscribing the way any discretion has to be exercised are generally unacceptable Eloff J sought to justify his approach with reference to a dictum by Denning MR in Halfdan Grieg 18 34 After quoting the dictum from Halfdan Grieg on which the arbitrator relied Harms JA pointed out that Lord Denning was a proponent of the view that all matters of law should fall within the sole domain of courts and that the other two members of the court Scar man and Megaw LJJ did not associate themselves with the limitation placed on the discretion of an arbitrator by Lord Denning Harms JA thereupon proceeded to hold that there is no obligation on an arbi trator to state a case if the requirements set out by Denning MR are present They are important factors to consider but they are not definitive 19 35 In the light of this judgment it is clear to the extent that both the arbitrator and the high court regarded them selves as bound by the test laid down in Halfdan Grieg that they had unduly fettered their respective discretions and had exercised it on the basis of an incorrect principle It follows from the foregoing that this court is at large to con sider the matter afresh 36 Further factors relevant to the exercise of the court s discretion become evident when one has regard to the purpose of s 20 It has been stated that the purpose of s 20 is to ensure that the ultimate control over legal issues arising in the course of an arbitration is left to the Court 20 This can no longer be regarded as good law The fact is that when parties agree to refer their disputes to arbitration they select an arbitrator as the judge of fact and law Ordinarily the award of the arbitrator is final and conclusive irrespective of how erroneous factually or legally the decision was 21 Section 20 therefore constitutes an exception to the general principle that it is the function of the arbitrator to decide finally all matters referred to him including questions of law 22 For this reason and out of deference to the principle of party autonomy 23 the court s powers in terms of s 20 should in my view be sparingly exercised As it was put by Donald son LJ in Babanaft s case 24 with reference to the now repealed s 2 of the English Arbitration Act of 1979 Section 2 is the successor in title to the old consultative case which more aptly describes its nature Put colloquially the arbitrator or the parties nip down the road to pick the brains of one of Her Majesty s judges and thus enlightened resume the arbitration It is essentially a speedy procedure designed to interrupt the arbitration to the minimum possible extent and it is an exception to the general rule that the courts do not intervene in the course of an arbitration 37 Further guidance as to the factors that should be taken into account by a court before exercising its powers in terms of s 20 1 can be found I suggest in the provisions of s 45 1 and 2 of the current English Arbitration Act of 1996 under the heading Deter mination of preliminary point of law 25 Sub section 1 provide s that the court may determine any question of law arising in the course of the proceedings which the court is satisfied substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties Sub section 2 b inter alia provides further that an application under this section shall not be considered unless the court is satisfied i that the deter mination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs and ii that the application was made without delay 38 Applying the above principles to the question posed by the arbitrator in this case the high court rightly expressed reservations with regard to the form of the question pointing out that i t is of course unusual for the validity of an existing judg ment to be called in question in the course of arbitration pro ceedings In my respectful opinion however it is not only unusual but also in appropriate where the very issue stated by the arbitrator has already been decided by a single judge in the same Division and where there are no conflict ing judgments on the point 26 to state that same point yet again for the opinion of another court 39 The mere fact that the Fund sought an opportunity to persuade a court to re examine the judg ment and the issues raised in Zysset should not have persuaded the arbitrator to state a question of law for the opinion of the court nor should it have persuaded the court to answer the question so stated When the parties agreed to have their dispute resolved by arbitration instead of litigation they must be assumed to have agreed that it would be decided on the basis of prevailing South African law inter alia as laid down in Zysset 27 If either of them had wished for an opportunity to ask the court to review or change the sub stantive law eg by reversing a binding precedent then arbitration was the incorrect procedure to achieve that result I accordingly agree with the sub mission on behalf of the claimants that
    http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/125.html (2013-04-07)